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Article 15

Two Statements on the Bouvia Case
Sta /e ll/ en/ h.!" A r chhisho/J Roger M il/IOn.!" o n / h e Unlinilllo us Ruling hI'
Ih e Cilli/i mlill :!nd /)is/ri c/ CO lirt or A p/h'1I1 A //o l\ 'ing Quadriplegic
1:'Ii ::llhe/h BOIlI 'ili /() Star\'(' Herselr /() /)elllh

W e have all felt th e pain and an g uish o f th e cas e o f Eli 7.ab e th Bou via
durin g the pa st three ye ars. A yo un g wo m a n. a 4ua d ripl egic. he r bo d y w ill
ne \' e r be res tored to an y rea sona ble le ve l o f no rmal functi o nin g.
Sh e has e x pres sed an int e nse d esire t o a vo id taking a n y n o uri s hment o f
an y kind . I n a w ord . s he ha s d ec id ed t o e nd he r li fe b y refus in g t o ta ke a n y
ty pe o f food o r no u ris hm e nt. Bo th th e hos pit a ls and th e S up e ri o r C o urt
ha d d eclared that s he di d no t ha ve th e right to so te rmin a te he r li fe .
T he 2nd C ourt o f A ppeal has now rul ed that th e "ri g ht o f pri vacy"
a fford s he r full p ro tec ti o n in he r d ec isi o n to e nd a ll n o uri s hm e nt.
Since the full ruling b y th e 2nd Court of Appeal is not a vailable at this
writing. it is not poss ible to g ive a full critique of th e issues and the Court's
reaso n1l1 g.
But the c on s ist e nt teac hin g o f th e C atholi c Churc h has al wa ys ta ug ht us
our respons ibiliti es in safeg ua rding o ur lives. as fo ll o ws:
Int e nti o na ll y ca usin g o ne's ow n dea th . o r suicid e. is therefore equall y as wro ng as
m urd er: su c h a n act io n o n t he part ora pe rso n is t o he con side red a s a rejec ti o n of

(in u' s so\"cn: ign ty a nd itH 'ill t!, pla n. Furth ermo re. sui cidl' is also O ft CIl a rcfu sa l or
l oy~ for sdL t h ~ d~ ni a l of t h~ na tura l in sti nct t(i l i Y~. a !'l ig ht fro m t h ~ dut i ~s of
justice and c har it y owcd to o l1 e's ncig hh or. t o \a ri o ll s com mu n it ies or t o t he

\\"ho le of soc iety

alth o ug h. as is

gl' ll l' rall ~'

psycho logica l fac tors rr L'~L'l1t t ha t ca ll d imi n ish
I"L' I1Hl \"l'

rccog ni/c d. at times the re an:
n:s po nsihil ity 0 1" ('\"(:11 cOl11 r k t d~'

it. I

T he 2 nd C o urt o f A ppeal has e nt e red a realm w he re its co mp ete nce d o es
no t lie . T he gift of li fe is prec io us . and it s a uth o r is God. Eac h o ne o f us is
g uardian and cus to dian o f tha t prec io us g ift. and we d o no t have th e
" ri g ht" t o e nd o ur life thr o ug h direct acti o n - s uch as re fu s in g t o ea t. T he
d oc t o rs tr eating E li n tb e th Bo u via ha \' e maint a ined th a t s he co uld - but
wo uld no t - eat so lid foo d. Co nse4 ue ntl y. t hey ha ve ha d to ta ke the
initia ti ve in o rd er to prov id e her no u ris hm e nt thro ugh for ced fe edin g.
Th e e rr o r of t he 2nd Co u rt o f A ppeal is fo u nd in it s pl a ei ng th e " 4 ualit y
o f li fe" as th e prim a ry c rit e ri o n w he re by a pe rs o n li ves o r di es. If th e
reaso nin g o f th e Co u rt p reva ils . and a pe rso n is lega ll y pe rmitt ed to e nd
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his or her life because they perceive the quality of their life to be
inadequate, are we far from the day when others - doctors, family
members, judges - may actually "order" the mercy-killing of a person
based upon the same logic?
Because of the critical nature of this case, and the future implications
flowing from it, I will issue a more detailed analysis and definite guidelines
to help guide us as soon as the full decision has been studied.
In the meantime, I ask all the members of our Archdiocese to pray for
Elizabeth Bouvia and support her through our love. Her life is precious,
she is valuable even if confined to bed and unable to move. She is our sister,
and she is a member of our human family. We love you, Elizabeth, and we
pray that you will accept our love and support as that strength which you
need so very much.
I

Dec/aral ioll
26. 1980.

O il

ElI/iIanasia. Vatican Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. June

Extended Statement by Archbishop Roger Mahony on the Unanimous
Ruling br the California 2nd Distriel Court of Appeal on the Case of
Elizabeth Bouvia

We have all felt the pain and anguish of the case of Elizabeth Bouvia the
past few years. A young woman and a quadriplegic, her body will never be
restored to normal functioning. Understandably , she finds her life full of
disappointment and burden .
Several years ago. she entered a hospital allegedly for treatment. But
once there. she refused to eat - an action she was quite capable of at that
time , if only someone would put the food into her mouth. She made it
plain. moreover. that her refusal was for a suicidal purpose: she simply
wanted to end her life of misery.
The hospital authorities sought and obtained a Court order exempting
them from allowing this suicidal action to be carried out under their
auspices and with their assistance. The Court authorized them to forcefeed her by intubation until she regained enough strength to be discharged
from the hospital. Since that time, her bodily powers have further
diminished . Nonetheless. she has resumed taking what nourishment she
can by mouth , even though she complains that this is becoming
increasingly la borious by reason of na usea and vomiting and, by reason of
aspiration into her lungs, dangerous .
Now in a County hospital. she recently brought su it in a trial Court for
the right to terminate intubation newly forced upon her, and to rely only
on whatever nourishment she could take by mouth . The trial Court
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rejected her plea, and she submitted her case to and was upheld by a Court
of Appeal. During the appeal, she disavowed what was apparently her goal
several years ago: to end her life. She also indicated once again her
willingness now to continue to take whatever food she could take by
mouth.
Immeasurable Value of Each Individual Life

Any effort , legal or otherwise, to resolve such issues, must begin with
our facing the fact that the life of an innocent person cannot be measured
against the burden which may inhere in it for that person or for others who
must care for him. Thus, human beings have no right to decide that the
very life of an innocent human being does not "measure up" properly, and
therefore may be terminated as burdensome by omission or commission .
This does not at all take away from the fact that we may indeed, and
normally shou ld, do all we can surgically, medicinally, and in any other
way to eliminate pain and other burdens even if eliminating those burdens
results also in a shortening of life.
Laws and judicial processes which ignore this immeasurable value of the
life of each and every innocent human individual in reality undermine the
very society they are supposed to serve .
For once a society decides that the human life of anyone innocent
individual can lose its va lue, and therefore that society should legally
establish a person's right to suicide, we question at least implicitly and
inevitably - whether we realize it o r not - the value of every person's life.
And for cases of persons which a low "quality of life ," but without
enough mental competency (or common sense, some would add) to end
their lives, we shall have shack led ourselves to a cha in of log ic which forces
us sooner or later to the conclusion that society ought to make the decision
.liJl· such persons.
The history of Nazi Germany exemp lifi es that logic , with its e liminati on
of thousands of the "feeble-minded," the politically obtuse, and, eventually
as many Jews as the Third Reich could get its hands on. One of the German
judges, tried at Nuremberg for his part in these "decisions ," pleaded that he
never knew death sentences based on lack of "quality of life" would come
to "that" - the death of millions.
In a well-known dramatization of that trial, the judge appointed by the
Allied Nations responded, "Herr Werner, it came to 'that' the day you first
sentenced an innocent man." So it is with judges today, as we have seen in
our own nation only a few years ago when an "Infant Doe" was refused a
commonplace , unburdensome, but life-saving surgery simply because the
infant suffered Down's Syndrome. So it is even when one, in basic
possession of one's mental powers, sentences one's self to death by way of a
decision for suicide. Such decisions, and laws or judgments upholding
them, invite both the degradation of individuals and murderous chaos in
society.
February, 1988
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No Duty to Add Burdens
True , a moral a pproac h which, to the contrary, va lues ea ch human li fe
as a pri ce less g ift can n o neth eless justi fy not adding heavi ly to the burd e ns
which already fill a pa tient's life. If taking food artificially, or even
na turall y, in a patient's ho nest judgment is a so urce o f signifi ca nt pain ,
di sco mfort. risk or eve n dehumanization added /() what he is already
expe ri e ncing or will ex peri e nce from his co ndition , o ne can defend the
pat ient's ri g ht to say "No m o re!"
This is a reasonable decision wo rth y of a human being, and ninetee n
hund red yea rs of co heren tl y developing Christian m o ral thinkin g affirm it.
For it is not a decision to end o ne's ea rthl y life, but t o tole ra te that life's
pass ing away (as we all mu st so meday) rather th a n adding nell' burd ens to
th ose a lread y prese nt in one's life .
Indeed, society has a ri g ht - eve n an obligation - t o pro tect a patie nt's
right t o make this eva lua ti o n of the burd e n in a procedure and decisions
which follow from it. eve n thou g h at times others may disagree with a
particular pa tie nt's thinkin g and choice in th e matter. The o pini o n of
Justices Beac h, Rot h and Compton recently made ava ila ble appears at
first to contain much which is s upporti ve bot h of th e moral o bliga ti o n not
to see k precisely t o end a life and of th e right to refuse procedures prec ise ly
because the y significantl y add burd e n. Eli za beth's prese nt willingness to
take whatever n o uri shme nt she can ma na ge by mouth (even th o ug h she
cannot long survive on this) would indica te prima/acie an intent to d o th e
same.
Dangerous Vagueness
Unfortunately, a longside these affirmations we find scattered throu g hout t he Court's opinion ambiguities which could undermine th e m. To be
sure, th ese a mbiguities are found m ostly in d eclara tions of public and
professio nal policy which the Justices merel y cite. No neth eless, th e
ambiguit ies remain.
For instance , the pa tient's right to "d ecide" is maintained repeatedl y in
th e Court d ec ision [cf. pages 9, 10, II], but it is not a lwa ys clear l1'hat the
pa tient has a "right to d ec id e": to ai m to end life? Or merely to tolerate life's
ending ra ther than use burdenso me medica l procedures?
Whet her or not our legal system has constructed such a "right to d eci de"
is, of course, a question for lega l scholars. From the moral a s pect ,
howeve r, such a lega l "right" is morally good la w if it protects the patie nt's
right to discern for himself how seriouslr burdensome a procedure is to
him or others - not if the law constructs a " right to decide" precise ly to
aim to end one's life whether by omission or commission.
Again,just as a physician has "a commitment ... to susta in life," bUl not
by every possi ble mean s, so a lso he has "a commitment ... to ... relieve
pain ," [page 17] but again, not by every p ossible m eans. From the moral
point of view, efforts aimed precisely at shortening life are among those
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means which society should rule out. The documents the Justices use, at
least in the parts they quote , do not always make this clear.
Invitations to Euthanasia

More serious, in the last third of the text of the Opinion , the Justices
suddenly switch signals and begin to appeal only to "quality ollile"
considerations. They even allege, without any proof whatsoever, that
diminished "quality of life" is the reason behind "all decisions permitting
cessation of medical treatment or life-support proced ures" [page 19].
For pages , no mention is made of the burdensomeness of the intubation
Ms. Bouvia is rejecting. Appeal is made merel y to the "hopelessness,
uselessness, unenjoyability and frustration" of her lile in its present
condition [page 20]. She considers " her ex istence mea ningless," a nd
cannot be faulted for so concluding [page 20]. She must be freed from "the
ignomin y, embarrassment , humiliation a nd dehuma ni zing as pects crea ted
by her helplessness" [page 21]. "Such a life has been physically destroyed
and its quality, dignity and purpose gone" [page 20].
Such remarks would seem to indicate an ideological commitment to
euthanasia, and are peculiarly out of place in ajudicial opinion . Not that
there is no place for ideology, religion or morality in law. But that place is
to be established by the consent of the governed through their constitution
or legislature , not by judicial fiat.
What see ms here to be precisely an instance of legislation by judicial fiat
incorporates an agnostic skepticism about a God Who gives meaning to life
even in one's suffering, and a materialistic view of man as nothing but an
animal whose value depends on the condition of his body. Millions of
Christians, Jews , and dedicated members of many faiths will find such
views repugnant.
Moreover, in imposing this distinctly partisan doctrine about
meaninglessness and valuelessness in life, the Justices would seem to
ignore or even move to overthrow our perennial legal tradition regarding
the State's interest in preventing su icide. That tradition means that if a
person is attempting to terminate his life, any society worth the na me
"human" will take what reasonable steps it can to stop him. Whether, to
what extent, and how such suicidal enterprises can be detected and
thwarted can rightly be debated.
The Justices' opinion , however , cannot be read as other than an attempt
actually to construct legally a "right to suicide," - to give society'S blessing
to a suicidal effort - a nd to authorize (and someday oblige?) medical
professionals and others to assist in it. "A desire to terminate one's life is
probably the ultimate exercise of one's right to privacy," the Court writes
[page 23]. In particular, Justice Compton in his concurri ng opinion seems
to reveal and revel in the euthanasic thinking of the Court, and with an
obvious logic the other two Justices side-stepped, blatantly argues for
suicide, not only by omission , but by commission, that is, by drugs and
procedures aimed to kill.
February, 1988
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Summary

Society must find a way effectively to recognize both the inviolable
sanctity of each innocent human life , and at the same time, the right of a
patient not to have additional burdens heaped upon him in the miseries he
is already experiencing . To achieve this moral balance, it is necessary to
distinguish clearly between , on the one hand, the burdens inherent in the
patient's very life , and on the other hand , burdens which a particular
procedure will add.
Only such a balanced approach , truly respectful of all that is most
profoundly human , would allow for the Elizabeth Bouvias of this world to
choose to allow death to come more quickly rather than to be subjected to
intubation and other truly burdensome, though life-extending, procedures
over a significant period of time.
Thus , while true moralj ustification can be found for Elizabeth's refusal
of intubation , any society concerned with a truly and ethically human
approach to the problems of the dying must reject the reasoning evidently
behind the Court's decision. As Justice Compton notes (approvingly!),
that reasoning simply applauds and further extends "the deviation from
that part of the oath" of Hippocrates by which physicians have sworn for
hundreds of years never to perform abortions [page 2 in his concurring
opinion ].
The Court's reasoning is an open invitation to suicide , euthanasia , and
worse - perhaps eventually the elimination even of those who do not want
to die . As such, it does a profound disservice to society and dramatically
weakens society's commitment - to value and protect all human life as a
primary goal of the human community.
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